I reckon....

I've been back in Corps since '06 and have never regretted anything more. Not for any political "we should not be there" reason, but because this is not the Corps that I left in '05. NCOs are nothing more than PFCs with a bit more pay. Junior officers are guys that I've pushed around on a regular basis, something I wouldn't have tried in '05. I have enormous respect for those that chose to enlist in the Marine Corps in a time of war, but I question some of that motivation (that's a whole other can of worms). I see a lot of Marines in the infantry field that seem to think that they are above the law if they've seen time in Iraq. I say "time in Iraq" because that does not mean they've seen combat. I've got two tours under my belt and the second was so timid my time would have been better spent training in 29 Palms or Okinawa. To be clear, my unit was split with two companies sent to one part of the Anbar Province, the other two sent to another part. The first set saw some combat, though after talking to some veterans that were with me on my first tour in '04, I was told that it wasn't even close to the intensity we saw in those days. I'm not trying to discount the experiences of these Marines. I'm simply attempting to point out that seeing combat has made some think that there is something special about them. I've heard Marine's accounts of their combat actions that would make most of the Marines I consider "My Generation" laugh. "My Generation" didn't consider themselves special, we just did our jobs the way we always had. There seems to be a mentality in the junior ranks that says "If you haven't been to Iraq, don't talk to me." It is even more evidenced to me when I tell someone from my old unit that I was in Ramadi in '04 and they act like I'm some kind of celebrity, and I didn't even see as much combat as some of my colleagues. My brothers-in-arms and I didn't go there for any kind of recognition. We went because it was our job. We did what we did because that was what we were trained to do.

This mentality does not seem to be limited to the infantry. I will spend the last days of my contract languishing in 1st Marine Division Headquarters Battalion, the POG-est of all POG-ville. Less than a week ago, I had a Marine bitching that his superior didn't understand where he was coming from because he'd been to Iraq.... He is in the 1st Marine Division Band. I asked him if he saw any action and he came back with, "We got mortared a few times." After further probing, I figure that the closest "mortar" landed no closer than 200-300 meters. If that constitutes "action" in the modern Marine Corps then we are all in trouble. The Corps is supposed to be the roughest, toughest bunch of people you can find right? Back in the day, when a mortar hit inside our compound (a frequent occurance) and no one got hit, we laughed that the enemy couldn't shoot straight. After a fire fight where no one was seriously wounded, we gathered up "smoke 'em if you got 'em" style and swapped stories. In those where someone did get hurt, we sat down and figured out what went wrong. Now it seems that if you can hear a round go off, you're an instant combat vet.

I think my point is that the Corps is becoming complacent. At all levels. I've seen Staff NCOs show up for patrols without a weapon, sentries that are more concerned with how much sleep they are getting than gettting shot and convoy leaders that worry more about how quickly they are going to get somewhere instead of getting the job done with the same number of Marines as when they left.

I will not say that this mentality is limited to the Corps. In my dealings with the Army over the last few years, I've seen some of the worst tactical and situational awareness I've ever had the displeasure of witnessing. Even the most disgruntled infantry Marine would cut his own wrists before allowing himself to sink as low as some of the Army "grunts" I saw in '04. In '07 it was even worse.

Does combat take a toll? Yes. Is it miserable? Absolutely. Does it make me better than you? Not at all. All it means is that I saw some shit that I hope you never have to. I'm not saying war is not neccassary. As long as humans are human, war will be a part of our lives and we will need people willing and ready to go into the fray. I just hope it involves as few people as possible and that those involved keep the proper mindset.

I am saddened by what the Corps has become, but I just don't have the strength to bring it around to what I think it should be. I hope that my peers that have decided to make this their life can make things better.

The dumbest move

One of my good friends, Sgt Herndon, approached me one afternoon early in March and told me about his plan to lead a fire team through the city to conduct a recon mission. He asked me to organize the convoy. It sounded like a good idea so I rounded up 4 HMMWVs and drivers and he provided about 8 Marines for the security detail. We rolled out of the Outpost a few hours after dark with a total of 16 Marines, 4 trucks and 2 M240Gs plus our personal weapons. We took a round about way to the drop-off point with me driving the lead truck with all lights out, driving by night vision goggles. A bad move due to the fact that the driver of the rear truck had only been driving for about a week and wasn’t used to NVG driving. It took us about 10 minutes to get to the drop-off point, which was only about a kilometer from Combat Outpost as the crow flies. As we rounded the last turn, the Marine manning the machine gun in the back of my truck told me that he could see tracer rounds. I asked him if they were coming toward us and he told me no, they were going strait up, but had been coming from directly behind us, always a few blocks behind, for the whole trip. I realized that we were not being shot at, but being tracked. Whoever was following us was using the tracers as a way to communicate our location. At this point, I realized that we had no way to communicate with the company. All we had were short range PRRs for inter-convoy communications. As I mentally kicked myself for this gross breach of procedure, we pulled up to where Herndon wanted to insert his team. As his 4 Marines dismounted, my gunner announced, “They’re getting closer!” referring to the tracer rounds. Herndon took his team and got into the closest building available and I verified that we had everyone that we were taking back to the Outpost and stomped on the gas peddle. I ordered lights on because we were going to be moving too fast for NVG driving, rather than risk being caught with only a small detachment and no communications. In my haste, I missed the turn that I wanted to take and had to continue down the street to turn at the point where one of the squads on patrol had been engaged by RPGs earlier in the day. When we pulled back into the hangar bay to park the HMMWVs, I thanked God that we had not made contact with the enemy. As it turned out, the entire security team had jumped onto the nearest truck to them, which ended up being the first two trucks, leaving the 3rd and 4th trucks with nothing but a driver. I would never have forgiven myself if one of those Marines had been killed or wounded. The next day, Herndon and I sat down and berated ourselves for the lack of planning that we put into our little “operation.” Needless to say, I learned a valuable lesson about the 7 Ps that night. Prior Proper Planning Prevents Piss Poor Performance. I should have made sure we had at least one radio. I should have put my more experienced driver in the rear truck. I should have been ensured that each Marine knew which truck they were to be in. Well, shoulda coulda woulda, we all learned how not to do it and got lucky that no one got hurt in the process.

Shootout on the History Channel

On Tuesday, December 13th the History Channel will be airing another installment of "Shootout." This episode will chronicle the actions of 2nd Battalion, 4th Marines in Ar-Ramadi, Iraq in April, 2004. From what I understand, alot of the airtime will go to Echo Company, which took more casualties during April than any other company in the Marine Corps. Golf Company, of which I was a part, should also be showcased. Overall, 2/4 recorded more casualties than any other battalion in theater during Operation Iraqi Freedom II. I encourage anyone reading this to watch.

The one that got away....

After speaking with a buddy of mine, I have decided to elaborate on an earlier post where I referenced another Marine who went home on leave and never came back to Ramadi. As before, I won't name him now, let's call him DJ. He, and the rest of the Company and most of the Battalion, knows who he is and will have to live with that for the remainder of his days. As stated before, I returned from Baghdad to arrive at Combat Outpost on April 8th. The two day battle of the 6th and 7th had ended and I was being regaled with tales of combat. That day, DJ received word that his mother was in the hospital and wanted him to come home. He asked a few of us what he should do. I said to take the 10 day emergency leave so he could see his mom, all present agreed. What I didn't know is, he had been making inquiries with the Corpsmen on how to remain stateside. He took the leave and was on a truck that evening. Nearly two weeks went by and we started to wonder, "Where the hell is DJ?" At first, I figured that there had been a transportation issue, no big deal, right? Another week, okay, it's no transportation SNAFU. The Company Clerk makes a few calls on the sat phone and discovered that not only had DJ put in for a leave extension, his mother had been out of the hospital for a week and was doing fine. This information came directly from DJ's father. Another month goes by and we get word that his family had hired a lawyer. The official word was, his mother was still in the hospital and would take months to recover. The word from those that were not able to deploy or had been wounded was that he was sitting on his butt at home taking advantage of the lack of supervision. This news incensed everyone from the Company Commander on down. He never set foot in the Middle East again. When I returned on the advanced party, he was one of those unloading our gear off the truck. I had forgotten about him for months. One look and I wanted to knock his head off his shoulders. Fortunately, for us both, my wife had decided to surprise me by driving to Camp Pendleton to meet me when I got off the bus. I spent a wonderful weekend with my wife and family, allowing me to calm down enough to have him within earshot. None the less, he remained ostracized from the rest of the Marines. The chain-of-command couldn't send him to the Camp Guard Force fast enough. I was outside my room, talking with a few guys, when we saw him walk by on patrol. He was overheard to say how messed up it was for them to not grant him leave with the rest of battalion. Upon hearing that, one of the guys lost it on him. I would have joined in had I not found it so funny. Enough said on that topic.

Memorial Day

These Marines and Sailors gave the ultimate sacrifice while assigned to 2/4 during OIF II. Not all of them were Infantry, they were Corpsman, Engineers, Motor Vehicle Operators, and other MOS's that support the Infantry. This list is in hopes that their memories will live on in those that knew them.

Pfc. Christopher D. Mabry
2nd Lt. John T. Wroblewski
Pfc. Deryk L. Hallal
Pfc. Christopher R. Cobb
Lance Cpl. Anthony P. Roberts
Lance Cpl. Kyle D. Crowley
Staff Sgt. Allan K. Walker
Lance Cpl. Travis J. Layfield
Pfc. Ryan M. Jerabek
Lance Cpl. Marcus M. Cherry
Pfc. Benjamin R. Carman
Pfc. Moises A. Langhorst
Pfc. Geoffery S. Morris
Pfc. Matthew G. Milczark
Cpl. Tommy L. Parker Jr.
Lance Cpl. Benjamin R. Gonzalez
Lance Cpl. Jeremiah E. Savage
Lance Cpl. Nickalous N. Aldrich
Lance Cpl. Caleb J. Powers
Lance Cpl. Jonathan W. Collins
Sgt. Kenneth Conde Jr.
Lance Cpl. Deshon E. Otey
Lance Cpl. Pedro Contreras
Lance Cpl. Juan Lopez
Lance Cpl. Todd J. Bolding
Cpl. Bum R. Lee
Pfc. Cody S. Calavan
Lance Cpl. Rafael Reynosa Suarez
Cpl. Dustin H. Schrage
Cpl. Jeffrey G. Green
Lance Cpl. John T. Sims Jr.
Pfc. Eric A. Ayon
Lance Cpl. William J. Wiscowiche
Lance Cpl. Andrew S. Dang
Petty Officer 3rd Class Fernando A. Mendez-Aceves

I'm pretty sure this a complete list, but if you know of others that I forgot, please let me know.

July 21st - 2004

Started as a day like any other in a war zone. I woke up, had breakfast, hit the head and went about making sure that all the morning working parties were done in a timely fashion. Some time around 1200, we got a call that the Battalion S-3 (Operations Officer), or just 3, had come under ambush just east of the Saddam Mosque, about a kilometer west of the Outpost. That fell smack in the middle of Golf Company’s AO (Area of Operation.) It was a typical insurgent ambush; IED followed by small arms and automatic weapons. The QRF platoon mounted up and got rolling. Civilian traffic had already stopped so we had a strait shot to the ambush site. However, we decided that we should detour to the street directly south of the MSR and come out to the west of the 3’s convoy. We diverted from the MSR and started down the side street. I guess we surprised a group of insurgents posted at the other end of the street that were probably waiting for us to move directly to the convoy and then move south. They recovered quickly enough though, and opened up on the lead truck with an automatic weapon and fired an RPG. I was in the third vehicle in line with the CO and watched from my turret as the rocket missed the lead truck by scant inches and slammed into the side of the second vehicle. I will never forget how that truck looked on the moment of impact. The HMMWV, with 4 Marines in the back and 2 in the cab, appeared to fold in half as the driver’s side hopped off the ground a foot. Amazingly, only one Marine sustained minor injuries and another had been given a concussion. All vehicles immediately got out of the kill zone and Marines jumped to the ground and sought cover. The machine gun that had initiated the attack was still launching rounds at us and I heard Gunny bellow, “GET SOME SUPPRESSION DOWN THAT STREET!” Upon hearing this, I tapped my driver on the shoulder and asked him if he was ready. “Let’s do it,” came his reply. He gunned the truck over the curb and I opened up with a solid 60 round burst, keeping true to Machine Gun Dictum #1: Gain fire superiority in the initial burst. I then set into a rapid rhythm of 8 round bursts with a 2 second pause. I had also noticed that there was a car parked about 50 meters to my front with it’s trunk open. Finding this rather odd, I pumped a burst into it and one of the tracers set the fuel tank on fire. Before I knew it, I was down to less than 300 rounds of ammo having begun the engagement with over 1200. Taking a quick break, I turned to the nearest Marine on the ground and yelled, “Get me more ammo, NOW!” As it turned out, I didn’t immediately need the ammunition. The insurgents were using the car I had lit up as some kind of ammo dump. The rockets, explosives and other munitions started cooking off and I told my driver to get the hell out of there. We pulled back around the corner of a building and waited for the blazing, exploding car to die down. In the initial attack, the lead vehicle had taken several rounds in the engine compartment and was only able to move far enough to get behind a wall before the engine quit. The recovery team had already shown up to tow the RPGed truck back to base and decided to just take both back. Seeing as how the Mk-19 was mounted in it’s turret, the CO ordered me to take the Mk-19 off the disabled truck and mount it in my turret. We had to switch the mounting posts, the ammo cradles and the shields since the mounts for the M240 and the Mk-19 do not match up. Back in the hangar bay this would take half an hour. Doing it in full gear and trying to stay out of the way of bullets while doing it just adds a little flavor. Between 4 of us, we managed the job in just under 25 minutes. There was a building directly to our north that stood 5 stories and was believed to contain 3-5 insurgents. Before clearing it out, we were to saturate it with lead and HE (High Explosives). Two Army Bradley Fighting Vehicles had shown up and were to assist in this endeavor. Unfortunately for me, I had somehow kinked my rounds when I loaded the Mk-19 and was having trouble getting them out and so did not get to participate in pounding the building, the honor going to another Marine from Weapons Company. Regardless, it was truly a sight to behold, 25mm cannon shells and 40mm grenades slammed into the face of the building for a solid 15 seconds. Now, these rounds are designed to defeat light armor and as such, had no problem with the shoddy version of concrete used in the area. Overkill? Maybe. But it served the purpose. The door was blown in with an AT-4 and a squad cleared the building, finding the insurgents, unsurprisingly, dead. We then went on to sweep the area house to house. In one of the first houses we searched, the one with the burned out car in front, we pulled out 8 Iraqis. They were in possession of 10 AKs, 3 RPG launchers with rockets and an RPK and one of them turned out to be serving in the local Iraqi Police force. He actually tried to get out of being arrested by flashing his ID. I guess he thought we would just forgive him for trying to kill us and let him go. There were no more major incidents that day, but we did take a few more captives, one of which, it turned out, had been hit in the throat by one of my bullets. He had been dumped in the courtyard of a nearby house when his comrades bolted. I don’t delight in killing, but I am glad I got him before he got me or one of my Marines. Of the two trucks that were disabled, the lead truck was back in service the next day. The second, on the other hand, was stripped and sent back to Battalion Headquarters. The sun goes down on another day in Ramadi.

Pictures

July 14th

In June, Headquarters Platoon had been combined with our Engineer detachment to create a provisional rifle platoon. All of the Marines in Headquarters had come from the line platoons. As such, all were trained as Combat Marines. The Engineers’ training was focused more towards demolitions. As one of two Corporals in HQ, I was made 1st squad leader. On July 14th, I took my squad out of the lines and conducted a patrol to relieve the squad that was on post at the Ag Center. We took over the Observation Post at around 1100. Around 1230, we received a call over the radio that an Army convoy was to be moving past our location on its way back to Junction City. Just as the convoy moved out our line of sight an IED went off where the convoy should have been. As soon as the bomb went off, all civilian traffic, pedestrian and vehicle, stopped and got out of the area. One of my squad members told me there was a car speeding around the corner and heading for the stopped convoy. I told him to give him a warning shot in the windshield. The driver didn’t stop and I shouted, “Light him up!” He and I fired several rounds into the car. It stopped in front of the soccer stadium across the street and the driver got out holding his side and staggered off the street. As soon as he stepped onto the sidewalk, gunfire erupted around us. We were taking fire from all directions and immediately called in the QRF. We had only one SAW (Squad Automatic Weapon), one M240G, and one M203 Grenade Launcher. The rest of the squad had M16A4s or A2s. We were keeping the enemy from advancing on our position and were able to pin enough of them down for the QRF to flank them. Unfortunately, the QRF had stopped across the street because of the suspected VBIED that was still in the middle of the road. I tried to signal them that it was clear, but by this time they had also come under fire from the north. A secondary QRF was rolled out and pushed south to rout the enemy there. The initial QRF pushed the enemy in the north back and moved to the west to link up with the Army convoy. The battle lasted for more than 2 hours and we had killed or wounded more than 30 insurgents and captured 5 others. There were no Marines injured. My squad was in desperate need of ammunition and waited for a resupply which showed up about a half hour after we called for it. We still had 4 hours left on post and were particularly alert after the massive firefight. After another hour or so, civilian traffic resumed it’s normal pace. Finally, our relief showed up and we were trucked back to the Outpost for debrief. I commended my Engineers for their actions during the fight. They performed to the standards of any infantryman. Needless to say, we all slept very well that night.